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Abstract—A privacy-preserving Support Vector Machine
(SVM) computing scheme is proposed in this paper. Cloud
computing has been spreading in many fields. However, the
cloud computing has some serious issues for end users, such
as unauthorized use and leak of data, and privacy compromise.
We focus on templates protected by using a random unitary
transformation, and consider some properties of the protected
templates for secure SVM computing, where templates mean
features extracted from data. The proposed scheme enables
us not only to protect templates, but also to have the same
performance as that of unprotected templates under some useful
kernel functions. Moreover, it can be directly carried out by using
well-known SVM algorithms, without preparing any algorithms
specialized for secure SVM computing. In the experiments,
the proposed scheme is applied to a face-based authentication
algorithm with SVM classifiers to confirm the effectiveness.
Index Terms—Support Vector Machine, Privacy-preserving,
random unitary transformation
I. INTRODUCTION
Cloud computing and edge computing have been spread-
ing in many fields, with the development of cloud services.
However, the computing environment has some serious issues
for end users, such as unauthorized use and leak of data,
and privacy compromise, due to unreliability of providers and
some accidents. While, a lot of studies on secure, efficient
and flexible communications, storage and computation have
been reported [1]–[3]. For securing data, full encryption with
provable security (like RSA, AES, etc) is the most secure
option. However, many multimedia applications have been
seeking a trade-off in security to enable other requirements,
e.g., low processing demands, retaining bitstream compliance,
and flexible processing in the encrypted domain, so that a lot
of perceptual encryption schemes have been studied as one of
the schemes for achieving a trade-off [4]–[13]
In the recent years, considerable efforts have been made in
the fields of fully homomorphic encryption and multi-party
computation [14]–[17]. However, these schemes can not be
applied yet to SVM algorithms, although it is possible to carry
out some statistical analysis of categorical and ordinal data.
Moreover, the schemes have to prepare algorithms specialized
for computing encrypted data.
Because of such a situation, we propose a privacy-
preserving SVM computing scheme in this paper . We focus on
templates protected by using a random unitary transformation,
which have been studied as one of methods for cancelable
biometrics [18]–[24], and then consider some properties of
the protected templates for secure SVM computing, where
templates mean features extracted from data. As a result, the
proposed scheme enables us not only to protect templates,
but also to have the same performance as that of unprotected
templates under some useful kernel functions as isotropic
stationary kernels. Moreover, it can be directly carried out
by using well-known SVM algorithms, without preparing
any algorithms specialized for secure SVM computing. In
the experiments, the proposed scheme is applied to a face
recognition algorithm with SVM classifiers to confirm the
effectiveness.
II. PREPARATION
A. Support Vector Machine
Support Vector Machine (SVM) is a supervised machine
learning algorithm which can be used for both classification
or regression challenges, but it is mostly used in classification
problems. In SVM, we input a feature vector x to the
discriminant function as
y = sign(ωTx+ b)
with
sign(u) =
{
1 (u > 1)
−1 (u ≤ 0) ,
(1)
where ω is a weight parameter, and b is a bias.
SVM also has a technique called the kernel trick, which is a
function that takes low dimensional input space and transform
it to a higher dimensional space. These functions are called
kernels. The kernel trick could be applied to Eq. (1) to map
an input vector on further high dimension feature space, and
then to linearly classify it on that space as
y = sign(ωTφ(x) + b). (2)
The function φ(x) : Rd → F maps an input vector x on
high dimension feature space F , where d is the number of the
dimensions of features. In this case, feature space F includes
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Fig. 1: Scenario
parameter ω (ω ∈ F). The kernel function of two vectors xi,
xj is defined as
K(xi,xj) = 〈φ(xi), φ(xj)〉, (3)
where 〈·, ·〉 is an inner product. There are various kernel
functions. For example, Radial Basis Function(RBF) kernel
is given by
K(xi,xj) = exp(−Υ‖xi − xj‖2) (4)
and polynomial kernel is provided by
K(xi,xj) = (1 + x
T
i xj)
l, (5)
where Υ is a high parameter to decide the complexity of
boundary determination, l is a parameter to decide the degree
of the polynomial, and T indicates transpose.
This paper aims to propose a new framework to carry out
SVM with protected vectors.
B. Scenario
Figure 1 illustrates the scenario used in this paper. In
the enrollment, client i, i ∈ {1, 2, ..., N}, prepares training
samples gi,j , j ∈ {1, 2, ...,M} such as images, and a feature
set f i,j , called a template, is extracted from the samples. Next
the client creates a protected template set fˆ i,j by a secret key
pi and sends the set to a cloud server. The server stores it
and implements learning with the protected templates for a
classification problem.
In the authentication, Client i creates a protected template
as a query and sends it to the server. The server carries out
a classification problem with a learning model prepared in
advance, and then returns the result to Client i.
Note that the cloud server has no secret keys and the
classification problem can be directly carried out by using
well-known SVM algorithms. In the other words, the server
does not have to prepare any algorithms specialized for the
classification in the encrypted domain.
III. PROPOSED FRAMEWORK
In this section, protected templates generated by using a
random unitary matrix are conducted, and a SVM computation
scheme with the protected templates is proposed under some
kernel functions.
A. Template Protection
Template protection schemes based on unitary transforma-
tions have been studied as one of methods for cancelable
biometrics [18]–[23]. This paper has been inspired by those
studies.
A template fi,j ∈ Rd is protected by a unitary matrix having
randomness with a key pi, Qpi ∈ CN×N as,
fˆ i,j = T (f i,j , pi) = Qpif i,j , (6)
where fˆ i,j is the protected template. Various generation
schemes of Qpi have been studied to generate unitary or
orthogonal random matrices such as Gram-Schmidt method,
random permutation matrices and random phase matrices [22],
[23]. For example, the Gram-Schmidt method can be applied
to a pseudo-random matrix to generate Qpi . Security analysis
of the protection schemes have been also considered in terms
of brute-force attacks, diversity and irreversibility.
B. SVM with protected templates
1) Properties
Protected templates generated according to Eq. (6) have the
following properties under pi = ps [23].
Property 1 : Conservation of the Euclidean distances:
‖f i,j − fs,t‖2 = ‖fˆ i,j − fˆs,t‖2.
Property 2 : Conservation of inner products:
〈f i,j , fs,t〉 = 〈fˆ i,j , fˆs,t〉,
Property 3 : Conservation of correlation coefficients:
〈f i,j , fs,t〉√〈f i,j , fs,t〉√〈f i,j , fs,t〉 = 〈fˆ i,j , fˆs,t〉√〈fˆ i,j , fˆs,t〉√〈fˆ i,j , fˆs,t〉 .
where fs,t is a template of another client s, s ∈ {1, 2, ..., N},
who has M training samples gs,t, t ∈ {1, 2, ...,M}.
2) Classes of kernels
We consider applying the protected templates to a kernel
function. In the case of using RBF kernel, the following
relation is satisfied from property 1 and Eq.(4)
K(fˆ i,j , fˆs,t) = exp(−Υ‖fˆ i,j − fˆs,t‖2)
= K(f i,j , fs,t) (7)
A stationary kernel KS(xi−xj) is one which is translation
invariant:
K(xi,xj) = KS(xi − xj), (8)
that is, it depends only on the lag vector separating the two
vectors xi and xj . Moreover, when a stationary kernel depends
only on the norm of the lag vectors between two vectors, the
kernel KI(‖xi−xj‖) is said to be isotropic (or homogeneous)
[25], and is thus only a function of distance:
K(xi,xj) = KI(‖xi − xj‖). (9)
For examples, RBF, WAVE and Rational quadratic kernels
belong to this class, i.e, isotropic stationary kernel, called
kernel class 1 in this paper. If kernels are isotropic, the propose
scheme is useful under the kernels.
Besides, from property 3, we can also use a kernel
KIn(〈xi,xj〉) that depends only on the inner products be-
tween two vectors given as
K(xi,xj) = KIn(〈xi,xj〉). (10)
Polynomial kernel and linear kernel are in this class, referred
to as class 2.
Some kernels such as Fisher and p-spectrum ones, to which
the protected templates can not be applied, belong to other
classes. We focus on using kernel class 1 and class 2.
3) Dual problem
Next, we consider binary classification that is the task
of classifying the elements of a given set. A dual problem
to implement a SVM classifier with protected templates is
expressed as
max
α
−12 ∑
i,s∈N
j,t∈M
αi,jαs,tyi,jys,t〈φ(fˆ i,j), φ(fˆs,t)〉+
∑
i∈N
j∈M
αi,j

s.t.
∑
i∈N
j∈M
αi,jyi,j = 0, 0 ≤ αi,j ≤ C,
(11)
where yi,j and ys,t∈ {+1,−1} are correct labels for each
training data, αi,j and αs,t are dual variables and C is a regular
coefficient. If we use kernel class 1 or class 2 described above,
the inner product 〈φ(fˆ i,j), φ(fˆs,t)〉 is equal to K(f i,j , fs,t).
Therefore, even in the case of using protected templates, the
dual problem with protected templates is reduced to the same
problem as that of the original templates. This conclusion
means that the use of the proposed templates gives no effect
to the performance of the SVM classifier under kernel class 1
and class 2.
C. Relation among keys
As shown in Fig 1, a protected template fˆ i,j is generated
from training data gi,j by using a key pi. Two relations among
keys are summarized, here.
1) Key condition 1: p1 = p2 = ... = pN
The first key choice is to use a common key in all clients,
namely, p1 = p2 = ... = pN . In this case, all protected
templates satisfy the properties described in III-B, so the SVM
classifier has the same performance as that of using the original
templates.
(a) person1 (b) person2
Fig. 2: Examples of Extended Yale Face Database B
(a) template (b) protected
Fig. 3: An example of protection
2) Key condition 2: p1 6= p2 6= ... 6= pN
The second key choice is to use a different key in each
client, namely p1 6= p2 6= ... 6= pN . In this case, the three
properties are satisfied only among templates with a common
key. This key condition allows us to enhance the robustness
of the security against various attacks as discussed later.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
The propose scheme was applied to face recognition exper-
iments which were carried out as a dual problem.
A. Data Set
We used Extended Yale Face Database B [24] that consists
of 2432 frontal facial images with 192×168-pixels of N = 38
persons like Fig 2. 64 images for each person were divided into
half randomly for training data samples and queries. We used
random permutation matrices as unitary matrices to produce
protected templates. Besides, RBF kernel and linear kernel
were used, where they belong to kernel class 1 and class
2, respectively. The protection was applied to templates with
1216 dimensions generated by the down-sampling method
[21]. The down-sampling method divides an image into non-
overlapped blocks and then calculates the mean value in each
block. Figure 3 shows the examples of an original template
and the protected one.
B. Results and Discussion
In face recognition with SVM classifiers, one classifier is
created for each enrollee. The classifier outputs a predicted
class label and a classification score for each query template
fˆq , where fˆq is a protected template generated from the
template of a query, fq . The classification score is the distance
from the query to the boundary ranging. The relation between
the classification score Sq and a threshold τ for the positive
label of fq is given as
if Sq ≥ τ then accept; else reject. (12)
In the experiment, False Reject Rate(FRR), False Accept
Rate(FAR), and Equal Error Rate(EER) at which FAR is equal
to FRR were used to evaluate the performance.
1) p1 = p2 = ... = pN
Figure 4 shows results in the case of using key condition 1.
The results demonstrate that SVM classifiers with protected
templates (protected in Fig 4) had the same performances
as those fo SVM classifiers with the original templates (not
protected in Fig 4). From the results, it is confirmed that the
proposed framework gives no effect to the performance of
SVM classifiers under key condition 1.
2) p1 6= p2 6= ... 6= pN
Figure 5 shows results in the case of using key condition
2. In this condition, it is expected that a query will be
authenticated only when it meets two requirements, i.e. the
same key and the same person, although only the same person
is required under key condition1. Therefore, the performances
in Fig. 5 were slightly different from those in Fig. 4, so the
FAR performances for key condition 2 were better due to the
strict requirements.
3) Unauthorized outflow (p1 6= p2 6= ... 6= pN )
Figure 6 shows the FAR performance in the case that a key
pi leaks out. In this situation, other clients could use the key
pi without any authorization as spoofing attacks. As shown in
Fig.6, the FAR (key leaked in Fig.6) still had low vales due to
two requirements, although it was slightly degraded, compared
to Fig.5.
Figure 7 is the FAR performance in the case that a template
f i,j leaks out. It is confirmed that the FAR (template leaked
in Fig.7) still had low vales as well as in Fig.6.
From these results, the use of key condition 2 enhances the
robustness of the security against spoofing attacks.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed a privacy-preserving SVM com-
puting scheme with protected templates. It was shown that
templates protected by a unitary transform has some useful
properties, and the properties allow us to securely compute
SVM algorithms without any degradation of the performances.
Besides, two key conditions were considered to enhance the
robustness of the security against various attacks. Some face-
based authentication experiments using SVM classifiers were
also demonstrated to experimentally confirm the effectiveness
of the proposed framework.
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(a) Linear kernel (C = 1)
(b) RBF kernel (C = 34, Υ = 81)
Fig. 4: FAR and FFR (p1 = p2 = ... = pN )
Fig. 5: FAR and FAR (RBF kernel, p1 6= p2 6= ... 6= pN )
Fig. 6: FAR with leaked keys (RBF kernel)
Fig. 7: FAR with leaked original templates (RBF kernel)
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